The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down two judgments providing guidance on the protection against double jeopardy (the principle ne bis in idem) in competition law cases. Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) provides that “no one shall be liable to be

On October 6, 2021, an important judgment was handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) on the liability of a subsidiary for the actions of its parent.  The Court confirmed (in Case C-882/19) that the well-established EU principle of single economic unit applies not only when the competition authorities take enforcement actions (public enforcement) but also in cases when a victim is seeking compensation for damages suffered as a result of the anti-competitive behaviour (private enforcement). Further, and more specifically, the CJEU confirmed that where the existence of an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU by a parent company has been established, the victim may also bring an action for damages against a subsidiary of that parent company.  However, it is not an automatic right to seek damages from the subsidiary and there are some conditions.

Continue Reading The EU Courts Confirm a Subsidiary Can Be Held Liable for Damages Resulting from An Infringement of EU Competition Law Committed by its Parent Company

The General Court has annulled the European Commission’s decision of May 11, 2016, in which it blocked the proposed acquisition of Telefonica UK (O2) by Hutchison 3G UK (Three). The General Court found that the Commission failed to prove that the merged company would harm competition or raise prices and that it had made several errors of law and assessment in its review. While the ruling will be welcomed by the telecoms industry that continues to consolidate, the General Court’s guidance on the EU Merger Control Regulation will be relevant for other mergers and acquisitions, particularly in oligopolistic markets (e.g. four-to-three transactions) where the merger does not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

Continue Reading The General Court Clarifies the Legal Test and Evidentiary Burden to Support Prohibition of Acquisitions under EU Merger Control Regulation

At the beginning of April 2020, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) handed down a preliminary ruling in Case C-228/18, Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and others and thus clarifying and reinstating certain aspects of the “by object” assessment. As a reminder, it is a well-established EU competition law principle that if a restriction is considered to be anticompetitive by object, the competition authorities are not required to examine its effects. For example, price fixing, input restrictions, bid-rigging, collective agreements to boycott, resale price maintenance are considered to have negative effects, in particular, on the price, quantity, or quality of goods or services, that they can be regarded as falling within Article 101(1) of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU)  without the need to demonstrate any actual or likely anti-competitive effects on the market.

Continue Reading The Court of Justice of the EU Gives a Preliminary Ruling Clarifying and Reinstating Certain Aspects of the “by Object” Assessment

At the EU level, Commission staff have adapted to working from home but are aware of the challenges in dealing with tight timeframes presented by merger notifications (including securing meaningful input from industry participants which may be affected by a transaction).  The Commission has therefore issued an appeal to request parties to delay merger filings as much as possible.  Other authorities have indicated that review timeframes may be extended.

Continue Reading Changes to Merger Rules

It is important to remember that as businesses struggle in these times to cope with issues like distribution, sourcing ingredients, components and other resources, they may look to collaborate with rivals.   In fact, many businesses have been doing exactly that.  Collaboration between competitors can be perfectly benign and may no anti-competitive effects (for example, in setting standards, lobbying efforts).  However, competition rules do apply and coordination of prices, market sharing, cost allocation, coordinated output reductions or sharing competitive sensitive information, would be prohibited.  Some restrictions are regarded as ‘hard core’ and rarely worthy of exemption (price fixing, customer and market allocations and quantity restrictions).  Penalties for infringement could lead to significant fines and possible private damages litigation.

Continue Reading Collaboration Between Competitors in Times of Crisis

Perhaps the first authority to warn about the perceived risks, the UK’s CMA issued a warning on 6rh March 2020 to traders about taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic.  CMA chief executive Andrea Coscelli said: “We urge retailers to behave responsibly throughout the coronavirus outbreak and not to make misleading claims or charge vastly inflated prices. We also remind members of the public that these obligations may apply to them too if they resell goods, for example on online marketplaces.”  This warning was triggered by the rising cost of hand sanitisers.  The CMA went on to warn that it would take enforcement action against those suspected of such conduct and, if necessary, would also consider requesting the Government to introduce price controls.  It has created a taskforce to monitor market behaviour during the crisis.  Details about the Taskforce, its mandate and how to lodge complaints can be found here.

Continue Reading Measures to Protect Against Predatory Conduct