Gun-jumping can occur when parties fail to fulfil the two obligations laid down by the European Merger Regulation No 139/2004 (EUMR). Article 4(1) of the EUMR sets out the obligation to notify the European Commission (Commission) of a concentration with an EU dimension before implementation. Article 7(1) sets out the obligation to stand still until the Commission declares such a concentration compatible with the internal market.

But would it be possible for parties to breach both obligations concurrently regarding the same transaction and thus to be fined doubly? The General Court answered in the affirmative in one of the most anticipated anti-gun-jumping cases.


Continue Reading Gun Jumping: The General Court’s Ruling

On October 6, 2021, an important judgment was handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) on the liability of a subsidiary for the actions of its parent.  The Court confirmed (in Case C-882/19) that the well-established EU principle of single economic unit applies not only when the competition authorities take enforcement actions (public enforcement) but also in cases when a victim is seeking compensation for damages suffered as a result of the anti-competitive behaviour (private enforcement). Further, and more specifically, the CJEU confirmed that where the existence of an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU by a parent company has been established, the victim may also bring an action for damages against a subsidiary of that parent company.  However, it is not an automatic right to seek damages from the subsidiary and there are some conditions.

Continue Reading The EU Courts Confirm a Subsidiary Can Be Held Liable for Damages Resulting from An Infringement of EU Competition Law Committed by its Parent Company

Last month, we held a webinar to discuss the modernisation of the EU’s distribution block exemption (the ‘VBER’) and of the UK’s own approach to this: the ‘VBEO’).   Economic principles increasingly need to be woven into the commercial application of the competition rules by businesses and we were pleased to have with us Dr Claudio Calcagno, Director at GMT Economics.  For those who were not able to participate in the webinar, here is a link to the recording.  We compared the EU approach with the expected UK approach and discussed a number of key developments.  Highlights from the webinar include:

Continue Reading Webinar Recap – Vertical Agreements in the EU and UK: How to Navigate the New Competition Law Landscape

No-poach and wage-fixing agreements – arrangements between companies seeking to prevent or limit the hiring of each other’s employees, or to suppress the wages and/or benefits of their respective current employees are not only currently under the spotlight in the US, but have also been subject to scrutiny by antitrust authorities in the European Union

Despite the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the EU Vertical Agreement Block Exemption Regulation (retained VABER) continues to offer a safe harbor with respect to potentially anti-competitive vertical or supply agreements with an effect on trade within the UK. In this Alert, Steptoe’s EU Competition Team analyses the UK Competition and Market Authority’s recently issued

A ‘killer acquisition’ is an acquisition of a potential rival whilst they are still in the early stages of their development, whose turnover is small or zero, in order to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition. Such acquisitions often fly under the radar of EU and national merger regimes which are usually only engaged when the turn-over of a target exceeds a certain threshold. They tend to be a particular problem in digital services where companies try to expand their market share whilst charging nothing or very little to begin with and pharmaceutical companies whose new techniques or medicines may take years to develop and not yield revenue for a significant period of time.

Continue Reading Attack of the Killer Acquisitions

On March 2, 2021, the UK signed a trade partnership agreement with Ghana.  Recently, Cadbury, which is wholly owned by Mondelez, has announced that it is moving some production of its iconic Dairy Milk chocolate bars from Germany to the UK. This note, which is in two parts, considers the connection between the trade partnership agreement between the UK and Ghana and the relocation of Cadbury’s Dairy Milk chocolate production to the UK from the EU and the implications this will have in terms of supply chain management.

Continue Reading Home-Coming of Cadbury Dairy Milk Chocolate Bars (Part 1)

The following note highlights certain barriers to free trade flows between the UK and the EU that have arisen in the post-Brexit era, with particular reference to rules of origin and origin procedures. It assesses the consequences these new rules will have in determining market power, influencing supply chain practices, and the application of UK and EU competition law in the future.

Continue Reading EU/UK Trade Post-Brexit: Rules of Origin and Their Impact on Competition Law

In August 2020 Steptoe’s Antitrust & Competition team in partnership with FTI Consulting hosted two webinars to discuss EU consultations which are likely to affect the regulation of digital space across Europe.

Continue Reading European Commission’s Regulatory Proposals in the Digital Marketplace – The Outcomes of Our Recent Webinar Discussions